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Contemporary Public Policy 
Issues in Industrial Relations 
Noël A. Hall 
The présent system of collective bargaining is more an 
exercise in the use of coercive économie and political power 
by labour and management thon a process of rational, logical 
argument and existing conciliation procédures hâve proven 
inadéquate in reflecting the public interest in dispute seule-
ment. What then is the impact of B.C. Bill 33 ? 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to delineate some of the major public 
policy issues currently plaguing the industrial relations scène in Canada. 
Those of you who know the field well will recognize the great difficulty 
involved in trying to generalize on such matters. Complications arise at 
the outset from the existence of eleven législative jurisdictions operating 
in the field. Further complications relate to wide économie disparities 
across Canada, from the Atlantic provinces to British Columbia. And 
finally, the lack of public discussion of the pressing issues arising at the 
bargaining table make the task of analysis ail the more difficult. 
Despite thèse difficulties, I would like to address my remarks to 
several areas of immédiate concern; areas that appear to be in greatest 
need of re-examination. As an over-riding thème, I want to suggest to you 
that our présent system for regulating labour-management relations and 
the collective bargaining process is in a shocking state of disrepair, so 
much so, that in my view the system can only be put in order by a 
wholesale rethinking of the institutions involved and their relationship 
to the broader society. I want to define, at least in outline form, a 
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substantially new approach to de-
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The Laissez Faire Doctrine 
The fundamental philosophy underlying our approach to labour-
management relations in Canada has been and continues to be an adapt-
ation of the économie doctrine of laissez-faire. The principle is clearly 
évident in such vital areas as internai union government, décisions with 
respect to the certification of trade unions, and perhaps of greatest 
importance, the System of collective bargaining that has developed in 
Canada. Let me be more explicit. 
Historically, we hâve adopted the position that trade unions are 
voluntary associations of individuals coming together with the common 
purpose of advancing their mutual interests. Ail législative jurisdictions 
adopt this stance in declaring that « every employée has the right to be 
a member of a trade union and to participate in its lawful activities ». 
Similar support can be found for the right of free association in légis-
lation prohibiting employer discrimination and interférence in the process 
of organization and in our gênerai prohibition against imposing any 
condition of employment through which the employer seeks to restrain 
an employée from exercising his right to belong to a trade union. 
The historical necessity for such public policy statements springs 
from two sources ; firstly, the need to free individuals from charges of 
conspiracy in restraint of trade and secondly, to protect employées from 
employer reprisais in the early years of organization. This latter need 
still exists in some industries and areas of Canada, but over the years we 
hâve allowed the concept of voluntary unionism to mask what might 
otherwise hâve been a deep and growing concern for internai union 
government. Our législation, by remaining silent on the question, adhères 
to the philosophy that trade unions are démocratie, self-determining 
associations whose constitutions and by-laws are virtually free from public 
scrutiny. 
The concept of voluntarism fails to recognize the extent to which 
compulsory membership provisions, either closed shop or union shop 
clauses, characterize collective agreements in Canada. It fails to recognize 
the extent to which Rand formula provisions and compulsory check-off 
provisions hâve become gênerai in our major industries. In effect, access 
to employment for a significant proportion of the workforce in crucial 
industries is largely a function of union membership or compulsory dues 
contribution. 
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Let me make it clear that I am not arguing against the closed shop 
or any other compulsory membership provision. Nor am I arguing against 
the power of taxation granted to trade unions under compulsory check-off 
provisions. My point is that the widespread existence of such provisions 
seems on the face of it, to mitigate against the argument that trade unions 
continue to be « voluntary associations ». More specifically, by granting 
the power that goes with compulsory membership clauses and check-off 
provisions, society has a right to require in return : ( 1 ) some fairly précise 
définition of the conditions of membership, (2) constitutional guarantees 
to protect minority interests and viewpoints within the union structure, 
(3) some définition of conditions under which membership may be 
withdrawn, and finally, (4) some clearer understanding of the internai 
decision-making processes within union structures. To my knowledge, no 
significant législative jurisdiction in Canada has shown any inclination 
to deal with this question, except on an ad hoc basis, for example, in the 
S.I.U. trusteeship. 
The Certification Process 
The analysis can be taken a step further by an examination of the 
certification process in labour relations. The laissez-faire doctrine is so 
firmly entrenched in this vital area of décision that almost without 
exception, labour relations boards hâve no authority to pass judgment 
on the question as to whether or not the group of employées involved 
ought to be represented by the particular trade union making application. 
Once the labour relations board discovers majority wishes, as evidenced 
by membership in the union or by a direct vote to ascertain employée 
wishes, the board must certify the union as the exclusive bargaining 
authority, the agent of the employées in the bargaining unit, with the 
power to bind them to a collective agreement. In popular terminology 
the philosophy is « union of their own choosing. > 
So called « government intervention » in the certification process is 
confined to determining majority wishes, to defining conditions for re-
application, and to counting votes or membership cards. To my know-
ledge, the only cleariy defined public policy expressed in the certification 
process is the attempt to protect traditional craft lines. As a conséquence, 
we end up with about twenty-two unions in the construction industry and 
almost as many in the shipbuilding industry. The need for a positive policy 
in such situations is surely obvious. Self-determination, pure and simple, 
does not necessarily lead to a rational system of représentation. I don't 
think anyone's fundamental rights would be seriously abridged by granting 
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labour relations boards the power to compel unions to organize themselves 
into some kind of joint council for bargaining purposes in industries 
characterized by multi-union représentation. 
Our failure to define a more positive rôle for labour relations boards 
in dealing with certification questions has led to the development of a 
highly fragmented System of collective bargaining. As a conséquence, 
there is a lack of intégration between bargaining units on the one hand 
and the décision making structure of trade unions on the other. New 
bargaining units are defined and absorbed into existing union locals with 
little or no concern for the representativeness of the resulting structure. 
The Collective Bargaining Process 
The laissez-faire doctrine has led to serious problems in dispute 
settlement in Canada. At the root of the difficulty lies an apparent 
unwillingness to up-date our thinking about the nature and purpose of 
the bargaining process. Historically the phrase dénotes a process of 
struggle between labour and management ; a struggle through which 
the submerged working class sought freedom from oppressive working 
conditions and économie exploitation. For most of us « collective bar-
gaining » may still conjure up a vision of workers storming the barricades 
under such romantic slogans as « workers arise, you hâve nothing to lose 
but your chains » or « solidarity fore ver ». It is not my intention to 
déride the genuine and legitimate accomplishments of trade unions under 
such slogans. Indeed much of the colour and drama of the union movement 
would be lost without them. And, some bargaining relationships are 
unfortunately still characterized in this primitive fashion, but collective 
bargaining has evolved into a much more complex relationshïp. It is a 
basic process by which individuals or institutions relate themselves to 
one another in our complex society. Apart from a vehicle for expressing 
dissatisfaction and unrest in the industrial scène, it is a process through 
which conflict is managed. Collective bargaining is the process through 
which conflicting expectations, interests, or needs are rationalized into 
some form of accomodation. 
Given this broader définition of the process, trade unions do not 
hold a monopoly on collective bargaining as a technique for advancing 
their interests. The process is used, either implicitly or explicitly every 
time one segment of our society attempts to advance its interests relative 
to ail others. For example, hospital boards « bargain > with governments 
for funds ; universities « bargain » in a similar manner ; prairie farmers 
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« bargain > with the Wheat Board in an attempt to advance their interests ; 
university students, by their collective behaviour, attempt to « bargain » 
with boards of governors and university senates. Similarly, the Canadian 
Association of University Teachers is in the process of bargaining with 
the administration at Simon Fraser University. 
Ail of thèse relationships are characterized by potential conflict, by 
persuasion, by negotiation, by compromise, and by the use or threatened 
use of sanctions designed to affect the desired behaviour or response. The 
significant variables are the extent to which the bargaining process is made 
explicit and the extent to which the resulting accomodation is crystalized 
into a binding agreement or contract. They serve to point up the fact 
that collective bargaining is very much a vehicle for activating latent 
power. Power springing from a monopoly position ; power derived from 
control over access to particular skills ; power arising from holding a 
stratégie position in the economy ; power based on widespread public 
support ; or power based on the irréfutable logic of one's stand. 
The Ru les of the Bargaining Game 
If it can be agreed that ail of us either individually or collectively, 
or through the institutions we serve, are involved in various forms of 
bargaining, then what is unique about collective bargaining between 
labour and management? 
Collective bargaining as it is currently practiced in Canada is not, 
by and large, responsive to logical, rational argument. To a growing 
extent the exercise of économie and political power is the key to final 
accommodation at the bargaining table. In far too rnany cases, wage 
increases reflect the raw économie power of either labour or management. 
Their ability to withstand the économie sanctions or the political pressures 
that each are capable of imposing upon the other seems to characterize 
the collective bargaining process. As a conséquence, the wage and salary 
structure does little to encourage the acquisition of skills. It does not 
adequately reward those whose jobs place them in positions of greater 
responsibility. It tends to under-value the semi-professional, and white 
collar occupations. Fundamentally the collective bargaining System responds 
to power and therefore favours those who are willing to withdraw their 
services to support their économie demands. Conversely, groups possessing 
a strong orientation towards serving the public or whose services are 
essential to the public welfare are in a real sensé at a disadvantage in 
collective bargaining. They are understandably reluctant to withdraw 
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their services as a strategy in bargaining and yet, the System is not equipped 
to deal effectively with non-power bargaining. It is not equipped to deal 
effectively with serious imbalances in the économie power of either labour 
or management. 
The Public Interest in Dispute Seulement 
It seems almost unnecessary to state that existing conciliation and 
médiation procédures hâve proven inadéquate to safeguard the public 
interest in dispute seulement. Such procédures, with fevv exceptions reflect 
an inhérent reluctance at ail levels of government to intervene in the 
collective bargaining process. True, we hâve had conciliation machinery 
set up by governments for many years, but it is a considérable misnomer 
to describe such machinery as « government intervention ». Such machin-
ery was provided merely to facilitate seulement, not to influence the 
nature of the seulement towards some government policy. The fact is, 
and I speak from some considérable expérience, that médiation and 
conciliation procédures as they hâve developed in Canada, do not change 
those involved with carrying the public interest into the dispute. Their 
function is, and I quote, « to find terms and conditions that the parties 
can agrée to ». The void in giving expression to the public interest is 
obvious. In some industries, particularly those characterized by a near 
monopoly position of both labour and management, some récent agree-
ments reflect an almost complète disregard for the public interest. I suggest 
that it does not necessarily follow that what is acceptable to the parties is 
necessarily in the public interest. 
A system of dispute seulement that places such a high priority as 
ours does on agreement per se, with little judgment as to the « goodness » 
or the « badness » of that agreement in terms of its impact on other 
bargaining relationships or in terms of its impact on the economy, employ-
ment, priées and inflation, is bound to encounter great difficulty. Existing 
conciliation and médiation procédures in Canada, because they are carried-
on by ad hoc boards, represent a fragmented approach to decision-making 
in what is in reality an integrated system. A change in one segment créâtes 
obvious pressures for changes in every other part. Further, because most 
boards are tri-partite, the chairman must of necessity compromise his 
analysis to affect a seulement. As soon as it becomes clear that a board 
is not going to be unanimous, the chairman's position becomes intolérable 
in that he becomes « captive » to either the labour représentative or 
the management représentative. The blâme for this must, in my view, 
rest at the doorstep of government for failing to create dispute seulement 
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procédures that are more responsive to rational, logical argument and 
less responsive to the coercive exercise of économie and political power. 
An Alternative to Laissez-faire 
The case for innovation in collective bargaining and dispute seule-
ment is not a difficult one to make. The real issue is: What should be the 
rôle of government ? What procédures or machinery should be created 
to implement this rôle ? 
I hâve suggested that our fundamental approach to labour manage-
ment relations is essentially that of laissez-faire. Intervention in décisions 
conceming collective bargaining has focused largely on facilitating rather 
that influencing behaviour. Is there an alternative to this basic approach? 
At the other end of the spectrum lies the possibility of compulsory 
arbitration and labour courts; of a system of highly centralized bargaining 
through institutional arrangements dictated largely by government, similar 
to the Swedish pattem. Such extrême measures are to my mind, neither 
désirable nor necessary. Despite the complexities of modem society, we 
still cling to two fundamental concepts that would be placed in jeopardy 
by such extrême measures. The first of thèse, the right to private property, 
is vital to our system of free enterprise. The second, the right to private 
contract, is equally vital. Just as the individual or corporation possesses 
a right to contract, so they possess a right not to contract. Rarely do we 
as a society compel individuals or corporations to exercise their capacity 
to contract. Our reluctance to interfère with thèse basic concepts is well-
founded, particularly when the matter at issue is the employment contract 
or the conditions under which private property will be utilized. But there 
is a large area for innovation between the extrêmes of laissez-faire and 
compulsion. 
New Rules for an Old Game : The B. C. Experiment 
If the présent system of collective bargaining is more an exercise 
in the use of coercive économie and political power by labour and manage-
ment than a process of rational, logical argument and if existing con-
ciliation procédures hâve proven inadéquate in reflecting the public interest 
in dispute settlement then indeed, new rules are badly needed to break the 
deadlock between labour and management. 
British Columbia has recently enacted a new pièce of législation, the 
Médiation Commission Act, more commonly referred to as Bill 33. Public 
discussion of the Act has focused almost entirely on those sections which 
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empower the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to impose binding arbi-
tration on the parties when it is necessary to protect the public interest 
and welfare. 
Even a cursory reading of the Act indicates that the compulsory arbi-
tration feature, important as it is, represents only a relatively minor part 
of Bill 33. The main thrust of Bill 33 is an attempt to move the parties 
away from their présent stance of coercive power bargaining into the realm 
of rational, logical decision-making in which the public interest will be a 
major déterminant in dispute settlements, without impairing the traditional 
« rights » of unions or management. It does so by introducing the concept 
of « burden-of-proof » and the concept of « fair and reasonable décisions » 
into labour management relations. 
The "Burden-of-Proof" Concept 
At the Médiation Officer stage, the Commission is empowered under 
Section 13 to conduct an inquiry for the purpose of deciding, among other 
things, « which party shall bear the burden of proof of any fact or matter 
in dispute ». 
Following this preliminary inquiry and if no settlement results, the 
Commission may proceed to a full hearing on ail matters in dispute. In 
the hearing, the Commission will proceed on the basis of naming the party 
which bears the burden of proof of each matter in dispute. Each party 
will hâve the right to cross-examine witnesses adverse in interest and to 
présent argument orally or in writing. 
Injecting the concept of burden or proof into collective bargaining 
is obviously a major innovation. Although I am not a lawyer, I understand 
that in law the burden of proof falls to the « accuser ». In effect one is 
innocent until proven guilty. The individual who brings a charge must 
accept the onus of proving his charge. The application of this concept to 
collective bargaining is bound to make it a more rational process, provid-
ing it can be adapted to meet the circumstances. For example, assume 
that the union is asking for a $.40 per hour increase in wages. Will the 
Commission assign to the union the burden of proving the necessity for 
the increase or will the Commission turn to the employer and say, « prove 
that you cannot grant a $.40 per hour increase.» If the wage argument 
hinges on « ability-to-pay », will the Commission ask the union to prove 
the positive proposition (that the employer does hâve the ability-to-pay) 
or will the employer be asked to prove the négative proposition (that he 
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does not hâve the ability-to-pay) ? Similarly, if the matter in dispute 
is a demand for a closed shop clause, upon whom will the burden of proof 
fall, union or management ? The application of the concept will be very 
tricky indeed on such matters as severance pay, automation and technolo-
gical change clauses, hours of week, statutory holiday pay, scheduling of 
shifts and the myriad of other clauses typical in most collective agreements. 
Demands that arise in thèse areas are not, strictly speaking, subject to 
« proof ». They are however, subject to argument and discussion. Never-
theless the idea of compelling both labour and management to justify their 
respective position is a sound one. It is not too much to expect of mature 
people on both sides of the bargaining table, even though the Commission 
faces a major task in implementing the concept. 
The Concept of Fair and Reasonable Décisions 
A second major innovation contained in Bill 33 is the attempt to 
shift the basis for décisions away from the established concept of « terms 
and conditions that the parties can agrée to » which characterized the 
conciliation board process. After hearing a dispute, the Médiation Com-
mission under Section 15 must hand down a décision stating « the terms 
and conditions of a collective agreement which in the opinion of the Com-
mission would be a fair and reasonable collective agreement between the 
parties together with reasons supporting the opinion held by the Com-
mission ». 
It was noted earlier that one of the major handicaps that ad hoc 
conciliation boards face is the necessity of endeavouring to find a seule-
ment that the parties could agrée to. Board chairmen under such terms of 
référence are inevitably placed in a position of having to compromise 
their analysis of the dispute to ensure at least a majority report. The 
concept of a « fair and reasonable » décision, together with supporting 
reasons, should place the Médiation Commission in a position to express 
an independent viewpoint. Indeed, the implication is that collective 
bargaining ought to reflect an ability to justify one's position as indicated 
in the « burden of proof » concept and a willingness to be persuaded by 
a « fair and reasonable » décision. Such an approach promises hope for 
a System of dispute settlement in which the public interest is given full 
voice without impairing the established rights of the parties. 
The Need for Research 
One further innovation relevant in defining a meaningful rôle for 
government in collective bargaining pertains to the need for research. 
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Section 39 of the B.C. Médiation Commission Act authorizes the Com-
mission upon referral by the Minister of Labour to inquire and report 
on matters relating to économie growth, labour-management relations, 
productivity, problems of adjustment, industrial research and technology 
research which will assist in improving the means of disseminating indus-
trial and labour information, and such other matters as seem calculated 
to maintain or secure industrial peace and to promote conditions favour-
able to the settlement of disputes. In addition, décisions of the Commission 
are to become public property. In short, an attempt will be made to ensure 
a well-informed public which should hâve the effect of increasing the 
persuasiveness of the Commission décisions. 
Problems of Execution 
Despite the potential that Bill 33 has for providing a more rational 
system of dispute settlement, the Commission faces a monumental task 
in giving full effect to its main provisions. For example, the décisions of 
the Commission are not to be considered defective by reason of stating 
the substance only of the terms and conditions of a collective agreement, 
without prescribing the précise language in which the collective agreement 
shall be written. Clearly, it is possible to agrée in principle but to disagree 
on language required to give effect to the principle. Similarly, Sections 18 
and 19 dealing with compulsory arbitration are frought with problems 
of exécution. For example, after the Commission has handed down a 
binding award terminating a strike, each employée must retum to work 
within 24 hours. Conversely, under the act no employer shall refuse to 
permit the return to work of an employée on strike. What happens during 
a protracted strike when key employées drift away to other jobs ? Will 
they be compelled to return to their previous employer ? What happens 
if as a resuit of a serious strike an employer's volume of business is seriously 
cut-back such that upon resumption of work, he no longer needs ail of 
his employées ? Will he be compelled to re-hire ail of those working at 
the beginning of the strike ? Thèse and similar problems of application 
will demand of the Commission a great deal of wisdom. 
Shortcomings of Bill 33 
There is a great deal that could be suggested to improve Bill 33. 
It is tempting to critieize the act for failing to define the « public interest 
and welfare » which is crucial to a décision by the Lieutenant-Governor in 
Council to order the Commission to hand down a binding décision to 
either prevent a strike or terminate an existing one. That définition is 
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probably more wisely left to evolve, given the traditional opposition of 
trade unions to compulsory arbitration. I think one could suggest however, 
that the décision to make such a judgment would be better located in the 
hands of the Commission as advice to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. 
Such a change would strengthen the Commission's rôle as a truly indepen-
dent body, free from political interférence. 
Bill 33 uses the phrase « to protect the public interest and welfare » 
as a basis for compulsory arbitration. This is potentially at least, a broader 
concept for example than if the phrase « essential services » had been 
used. This latter might generally be interpreted as applying to such occupa-
tions as firemen, policemen, nursing and health care services, ferry and 
transportation facilities, and perhaps municipal government employées. 
Even in thèse last two fields, we hâve shown both provincially and 
federally, that our society possesses great ability to adjust when apparently 
« essential > services are withdrawn. Federally, we hâve experienced 
nationwide strikes in postal services, railway transportation, air line opér-
ations, longshoring and the like. Provincially, we hâve experienced a 
strike of operating engineers in hospitals, civic employée groups, including 
sanitation services. We hâve also had strikes of employées in hydro 
employées and gas distribution services. Such strikes with the exception 
of policemen, firemen and nurses, cause a great deal of public incon-
venience and annoyance, but whether or not they pose a threat to the 
« public interest and welfare » is subject to debate. Certainly, a judgment 
on the matter would hâve to take into account the duration of the strike 
the géographie area affected by the strike, the ability of consumers of the 
product or service to affect substitutes and perhaps the number of 
employées involved. 
The most difficult aspect of the « public interest and welfare » concept 
lies not in essential services, but rather, in those industry where continued 
production is closely related to the économie health of the province. Pro-
tracted strikes in forestry, pulp and paper, mining and perhaps fishing 
might well be more detrimental to the public interest than a strike of 
municipal employées in for example, Delta municipality. Even in thèse 
industries, one would hope that the persuasive powers of the Commission 
could be used to affect reasonable settlements, without resort to com-
pulsion. As a minimum, it seems clear that the over-use of compulsion 
will hâve the effect of driving disputes back to the plant level, rather than 
bringing them into the open for settlement. Such an event would hardly 
contribute to sound labour-management relations. 
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In many respects, the act if interpreted literally could improve 
extremely difficult to administer. In many sections, the wording is more 
constraining than is necessary and may leave the Commission with too 
little discrétion. This is particularly relevant in the section already noted 
compelling a return to work and an obligation to re-hire foUowing a binding 
décision. It is also a problem in applying the burden-of-proof concept. 
It may well be that both labour and management will find the burden-of-
proof so onerous that they will begin to adopt stratégies to circumvent 
the terms of références of the Commission. It is worth nothing that the 
parties are not bound to submit a dispute to the Commission, prior to 
the taking of strike or lockout action. This is another of those major 
changes in the act that has gone virtually unnoticed. As I read the act, 
the Médiation Commission can only enter a dispute at the request of either 
party or alternatively, at the direction of the Minister of Labour, // he 
considers that the public interest is or may be affected by a dispute. To 
the extent that labour and management may find it to their mutual ad-
vantage not to place their disputes before the Commission, the Commission 
may be dealing with something less than the total industrial relations 
scène. 
In viewing Bill 33 in total, it is not at ail clear how labour and 
management will react to its provisions, apart from the compulsory arbi-
tration feature. I am not at ail convinced that the parties, labour and 
management, are prepared to accept the full implications of the burden-of-
proof concept. Its application may prove equally demanding on both 
parties, with the degree of public scrutiny implied. For example, in hand-
ing down « fair and reasonable » décisions the Commission must by 
implication involve itself in judgments concerning the potential impact 
of wage increases in costs of production, on assessing the impact of cost 
increases on profits and sales, and on assessing the ability of the employer 
to absorb a cost increase without a corresponding increase in priées. 
Summary 
Clearly, there is a great deal more to Bill 33 than the question of 
compulsory arbitration. Important as that provision is, the main inno-
vations lie in providing a full-time Commission to replace the ad hoc 
conciliation board system. This in itself should provide a more rational 
system of disputes seulement in British Columbia. That objective should 
be further enhanced by introducing the concept of burden-of-proof into 
collective bargaining and the concept of fair and reasonable settlement 
into décisions concerning collective agreements. Assuming that Sections 
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18 and 19 are used with constraint, Bill 33 represents the kind of inno-
vation that is possible between the extrêmes of laissez-faire and that of 
compulsion in the settlement of industrial disputes. Despite some obvious 
shortcomings, such an approach promises hope for a system of collective 
bargaining in which the public interest is given full voice, without impair-
ing the established rights of the parties. Whether it works in practice will 
dépend upon the wisdom of the Commission and the goodwill of labour 
and management. 
LES POLITIQUES CONTEMPORAINES ET LES RELATIONS 
INDUSTRIELLES: QUELQUES IMPLICATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Le but de cet article est de décrire quelques-unes des implications des politiques 
publiques sur les relations industrielles au Canada. Nous avons également l'intention 
de définir, au moins dans ses grandes lignes, une nouvelle façon de prendre des 
décisions dans le domaine des relations de travail. 
LA DOCTRINE DU LIBÉRALISME ÉCONOMIQUE 
La philosophie de notre approche des relations patronales-ouvrières au Canada 
a toujours été et continue d'être une adaptation de la doctrine du libéralisme écono-
mique. 
LA PROCÉDURE D'ACCRÉDITATION 
La doctrine du laissez-faire est tellement ancrée dans cette procédure d'im-
portance que presque toutes les commissions de relations du travail n'ont pas le 
pouvoir nécessaire pour juger de la qualité de représentation d'une organisation 
syndicale donnée. Notre incapacité à définir un rôle plus positif pour les com-
missions de relations du travail en ce qui a trait à l'accréditation a mené au déve-
loppement d'un système très fragmenté de négociation collective. 
LE PROCESSUS DE NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
La doctrine du laissez-faire a causé de sérieux problèmes dans le règlement 
des conflits au Canada. En fait, la négociation collective est un processus par lequel 
les intérêts, attentes et besoins divergents sont rationalisés sous la forme du compro-
mis. Ce n'est donc pas une question de monopole d'usage de cette technique par les 
syndicats. 
LES RÈGLES DU JEU 
1. — Au Canada la négociation collective n'est pas consécutive à une série d'argu-
ments logiques et rationnels. 
2. — Le pouvoir économique et politique demeure l'instrument majeur à la table 
des négociations. 
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L ' INTÉRÊT PUBLIC ET LE RÈGLEMENT DES CONFLITS 
La conciliation et la médiation réussissent mal à protéger l'intérêt public 
dans le règlement des conflits. C'est un mécanisme qui a pour but de faciliter 
et non d'influencer l'atteinte et la nature du règlement. 
Un système qui, comme le nôtre met plus d'emphase sur l'atteinte d'une 
entente plutôt que sur les conséquences de cette entente sur les autres négociations 
est voué au départ à de sérieuses difficultés. 
U N REMÈDE AU LIBÉRALISME ÉCONOMIQUE 
L'arbitrage obligatoire et les tribunaux du travail représentent une solution 
qui à mon avis n'est ni désirable ni nécessaire. Nous sommes donc en présence 
des deux pôles extrêmes d'un continuum (laissez-faire et arbitrage obligatoire) à 
l'intérieur duquel se situe la solution idéale. 
LES RÈGLES DU J E U : L'EXPÉRIENCE DE LA COLOMBIE BRITANNIQUE 
L'imposition de l'arbitrage par le ministre lorsque l'intérêt public est en jeu 
explique la popularité qui entoure le "Médiation Commission Act" ou encore le 
bill 33 de la Colombie Britannique. Le but de ce bill est en fait de tenter d'éloigner 
les parties de la notion de négociation basée sur la force économique et politique 
pour les faire tendre le plus possible vers le règlement rationnel des conflits, règle-
ment qui mettrait l'intérêt public au centre de ses préoccupations. 
L E CONCEPT DE "FARDEAU DE LA PREUVE" 
En vertu du bill 33, la Commission de médiation désigne la partie à laquelle 
incombe le fardeau de la preuve. C'est donc une innovation importante. 
L E BESOIN DE RECHERCHE 
L'article 39 de ce bill 33 autorise la Commission, après avoir référé au ministre, 
à enquêter sur des matières, telles la croissance économique, les relations patronales-
ouvrières, la productivité, les problèmes d'adaptation. En plus, les décisions de la 
Commission deviennent propriété publique. 
LES PROBLÈMES D'APPLICATION 
La Commission a le pouvoir de déterminer le principe qui servira à un accord 
mais non les termes à utiliser dans l'entente. C'est là une difficulté sérieuse. On 
peut s'entendre sur les principes et non sur les mots. L'arbitrage tel que conçu 
dans ce bill pose également de sérieux problèmes. 
CONCLUSION 
Est-ce que les partenaires en relations du travail sont prêts à envisager une 
législation tel le bill 33 ? Sont-ils prêts à accepter le concept du fardeau de la preuve ? 
